Basic Argument for Fatalism

Metaphysics The Basic Argument for theological Fatalism Fatalism Fatalism is the scene that ein truththing that happens in entirely unavoidable. Since everything that happens is unavoidable, none of our actions are genuinely up to us and we business office little to do anything other than what we actually do. Here is Richard Taylor on what the fatalistic believes Fate from Metaphysics, 4th Ed (Pearson, 1991) A fatalist is soul who believes that whatever happens is and always was unavoidable.He presupposes it is non up to him what pass on happen a thousand years hence, next year, tomorrow, or the very next morsel. (52) A fatalist thinks of the forthcoming in the way we all think of the past, for everyone is a fatalist as he looks back on things. (52) We all think of the past as something settled and fixed, to be taken for what it is. We are never in the least tempted to try to modify it. It is non in the least up to us what happened last year, yesterday, or even a moment a go, any more than are the motions of the heaves or the political developments in Tibet. We say of past things that they are no longer within our power. The fatalist says they never were. (52-53) Theological Fatalism According to the main versions of Western Mo nonheism (e. g. traditional Christianity), divinity is omniscient. To be omniscient is to have (in some important sense) unlimited knowledge. Its hard to say what this amounts to, but lets use the sideline definition (since its common) x is omniscient = for x knows every admittedly proposition and x does not believe any bastard propositions.Many batch think that omniscience is incompatible with human shrivedom, because it implies the doctrine of theological fatalism. Theological fatalism is the view that all human actions are unavoidable (and we are powerless to do anything other than what we actually do) because beau ideal has exhaustive foretellledge of all future human actions. Here is an important statement of the lean for theological fatalism from Augustine (On bleak Choice of the Will, Book III) I very much wonder how idol outhouse have foreknowledge of everything in the future, and yet we do not sin by necessity.It would be an irreligious and completely insane bam on deitys foreknowledge to say that something could happen other than than as paragon foreknew Since divinity foreknew that Adam was going to sin, his sin unavoidably had to happen. How, whence, is the bequeath free when such inevitable necessity is found in it? for sure this is the problem How is it that these ii propositions are not contradictory and inconsistent (1) God has foreknowledge of everything in the future and (2) We sin by the leave alone, not by necessity? For, you say, if God foreknows that someone is going to sin, and whence it is infallible that he sin.But if it is necessary, the will has no choice about whether to sin there is an inescapable and fixed necessity. And so you fear that this con sideration forces us into one of cardinal positions either we draw the heretical conclusion that God does not foreknow everything in the future or, if we cannot accept this conclusion, we must admit that sin happens by necessity and not by will. The Basic Argument for Theological Fatalism Where S stands for any somebody whatsoever and A stands for any action, Augustines short letter can be stated as 1. For any person, S, and an action, A, that S fulfils, God knew in cast aside that S will do A. 2.If God knows in advance that S will do A, then it necessary that S will do A. 3. Therefore, it is necessary that S will do A. 4. If it is necessary that S will do A, then S is not free to refrain from run A. 5. If S is not free to refrain from per get uping A, then S does not freely perform A. 6. Therefore, no person ever acts freely. Evaluating the argument Premise 2 is ambiguous P2a Necessarily, If God knows in advance that S will perform A, then S will perform A (De Dicto) P2b If God knows in advance that S will perform A, then inescapably S will perform A (De Re) P2a is true but the resulting argument is invalidP2a is true. It says that the proposition if God knows in advance that S will perform A, then S will perform A is necessarily true and this just means that it is impossible for God to know in advance that, for example, I will sack my gird at some time and I fail to raise my offset at that time. We can set up this by saying that Gods knowing in advance that I will raise my encircle at some time logically entails that I will raise my arm at that time. P2a is a way of expressing this truth. The resulting argument is invalid. Using P2a as the key premise, the argument is 1.Necessarily, if God knows in advance that S will perform A, then S will perform A. 2. God knows in advance that S will perform A. 3. Therefore, necessarily, S will perform A. But this argument is invalid (the conclusion doesnt follow from the premises). We can show this by means of a counterexample (an argument of the same form with true premises and a absurd conclusion). The form of this argument is 1. Necessarily, If p, then p. 2. P 3. Therefore, necessarily q. To see that the argument is invalid, use the following substitutions p = K. Sharpe weighs over 200lbs, q = K. Sharpe weighs over 199lbs. . Necessarily, If K. Sharpe weighs over 200lbs, then K. Sharpe weighs over 199lbs. 2. K. Sharpe weighs over 200lbs 3. Therefore, necessarily K. Sharpe weighs over 199lbs. The premises of this argument are true but the conclusion is obviously false (I could go on a diet and successfully lose some weight). I weigh over 199lbs but not basically. I could weigh less than 199lbs and, in fact, I did weigh less than 199lbs at one point. All that follows from the first two premises is that, in fact, I in fact weight more than 199lbs. It doesnt follow that it is impossible for me to weigh less than 199lbs.Just in case you are not convinced, here is a second counterexampl e (Plantingas) 1. Necessarily, if I know that George Clooney is a bachelor, then George Clooney is a bachelor. 2. I know that George Clooney is a bachelor. 3. Therefore, it is necessarily true that George Clooney is a bachelor Again, the premises are true but the conclusion is false. George Clooney is a bachelor but he is not essentially a bachelor. He could get married, he just chooses not to. All that follows from the first two premises is that George Clooney is in fact a bachelor (not that he is essentially a bachelor).P2b renders the argument valid but it is obviously false 1. If God knows in advance that S will perform A, then necessarily S will perform A. 2. God knows in advance that S will perform A. 3. Therefore, necessarily S will perform A. This argument is valid (its just modus ponens) and so if the premises were true then conclusion would be true as well. But P2b is false. Given the de re reading of P2b, it says that whatever propositions God knows are necessarily true o r, to put the point in terms of properties, if God knows that some object has a property then the object has that property essentially.Taken in this way, P2b is obviously false (nor does it follow from omniscience). Since the basic argument has to rely on either P2a or P2b, the argument is either invalid or relies on a false premise. Either way its unsound. Here is a way of opinion about this criticism of the argument. From the fact that God knows that capital of Minnesota will mop up his yard on July 7, 2015 it follows that, on July 7 2015, Paul mows his yard and that he does not refrain from mowing his yard on that day.But, it does not follow that it is metaphysically impossible for Paul to refrain from mowing his yard that day (that Paul does not refrain from mowing and it is impossible that Paul refrain from mowing are two very different things). All that follows from the fact that God knows in advance that Paul will mow is that Paul will not exercise his power to refrain not that he lacks the power the power to refrain. The basic argument for theological fatalism needs the later inference, but that inference is not a good one. Thus, the basic argument fails.